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And Then There Was One
By Julien Barnes-Dacey

Syria’s long-delayed entry into a European Union (EU) Association Agreement (AA) is facing a new setback as the Dutch government digs its heels in against the signing of the treaty in a move which could hinder Syria’s reform process, say critics.

The Dutch opposition comes amid ongoing concerns about Syria’s human rights record. However, local observers say that it is precisely through greater European integration that reforms, in both economic and political fields, will be best advanced.

Syria and the European Commission (EC) finalised a new statement of terms and conditions for the agreement last December, but in order for the AA to be passed all EU member states must approve the treaty in the European Council of Ministers. The Dutch government is now blocking this ratification.

“The EU has many moving parts and that always makes any agreement complicated because member states are always slightly out of step with one another,” a European diplomat in Damascus said. “There will be some that really want to push the agreement though, and there are others that may be more reluctant or will want to hold it up by taking a very hard line. At the moment it’s the Dutch who are holding it up.”

Charges of double standards

The Dutch position has provoked controversy, with critics accusing the EU of double standards. Several Mediterranean countries, such as Israel and Egypt, have been granted an AA despite poor human rights records.

“Why don’t the Dutch speak out against other corners of the world where there are much stronger human rights abuses?” Thabet Salem, a Damascus-based political analyst, said. “How come they have such good relations with the Israelis who killed thousands of Gazans?”

Some Western diplomats also complain that the Netherlands’s stance is allowing a real opportunity to press Syria further on political reform slip by. The AA includes a formal political dialogue process – accepted by the Syrians – which would compel the government to discuss human rights with their European counterparts at regular intervals.

Neither the Dutch embassy nor the EC would respond to interview requests on the matter, but observers say the ball is firmly in the Dutch court, with the fate of the AA largely dependent on internal Dutch politics.

Syria is now the only Mediterranean country, other than Libya, not to have entered an AA. The agreement falls under the Barcelona Process which was started in 1995 to foster dialogue between EU member states and countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

The never-ending agreement

The AA agreement, which promises increased cooperation between Syria and Europe in the fields of economy, environment, science and technology, was originally initialled in October 2004. However, it failed to reach the final signing stage following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and Syria’s subsequent international isolation.

On the back of a growing international consensus that Syria needed to be pulled back into the political process, spearheaded by French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy and his desire to involve Syria in the French-led Union of the Mediterranean, AA negotiations were revived, resulting in December’s signing of a revised agreement.

Diplomats say the renewal of negotiations was a response to positive Syrian behaviour in Iraq and Lebanon. While other issues of contention, such as alleged Syrian nuclear activity, remain unresolved, European governments now feel that more can be achieved by robustly engaging Syria.

Despite Dutch opposition, the AA now enjoys widespread backing in Europe and European diplomats in Damascus said they expect the Dutch government to ratify the agreement.

The Syrian government, meanwhile, continues to express a strong desire to enter an AA, fully aware of its political symbolism.

“We are not flirting with Europe, this is a permanent marriage,” Syrian Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdullah al-Dardari said in December. “When there is a window of opportunity to go ahead with this AA, Syria will not hesitate to do so as long as it is in Syria’s interests.”

Trade and aid benefits

The signing of an AA would open up free trade with the EU – already Syria’s largest trading partner – potentially boosting the country’s economy. Algeria saw bilateral trade with the EU increase by 9.3 percent between 2003 and 2007, following the signing of an AA in 2002.

Economists, however, warn against expecting too much, saying the economic ramifications could be smaller than hoped for. Other than energy, Syria’s main exports to the EU are agricultural and textile goods and both will still be subject to EU protectionism.

“It will help Syria, but it won’t be huge,” a Western diplomat based in Damascus said, adding that in the short term the biggest gain for Syria could be increased EU expertise. While the EU remains the country’s largest foreign donor, its contribution is the smallest to any of its southern Mediterranean partners.

For the period 2007 to 2013, the EU has set aside EUR 130m for Syria under its European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). This compares to EUR 654m for Morocco, EUR 632m for the West Bank and Gaza, EUR 558m for Egypt, EUR 300m for Tunisia, EUR 265m to Jordan, EUR 220m for Algeria and EUR 187m for Lebanon.

Abdul Kader Husrieh, a financial consultant and advisor to the government on reform issues, says the real benefits of an AA relate to reform, rather than trade or aid. Husrieh believes greater Syrian integration into the European economy, as well as the subsequent transfer of knowledge, will significantly encourage the country’s reform schedule.

“The AA will push the reform process forward,” he said. “The government is working on a reform agenda, but this will lead to further changes as a result of harmonisation.”

Again, however, other analysts are less optimistic, saying the Syrian government has already implemented many of the necessary reforms related to EU integration.

“Dardari has been leveraging reforms out of the AA for the last five years,” said the Western diplomat, adding there is little more in terms of economic change that the EU can link to the signing of an AA.

In the midst of this debate, attention is now on Amsterdam to see whether the Hague will relent and allow the AA to proceed. For the moment, it remains unclear whether or not the Netherlands’ government will soften its stance.

source : Syria Today - September 2009


External Pressures and Internal Constraints

For the past nine years, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has been trying to implement his vision of reform while minimising the political and social costs. Due to domestic and external constraints, the pace of reform has been slow. Syria’s domestic politics have always been tied to its foreign policy, generally dancing to the tune of regional and international developments. This trend has led many to argue that Syria’s foreign policy is its main export. Yet, in retrospect, one can see that the country’s domestic needs have, in most cases, defined its foreign relations and regional alliances.

Throughout the 1950s' and 1960's, Syria relied heavily on the Soviet Union, not only for security assurances, but also for economic aid. As a result, a Soviet-style planned economy was introduced and most large private businesses were nationalised.

Throughout the 1970's, improvements in the relationship with conservative Arab regimes and the West produced the first wave of domestic liberal measures in two decades. This earned Syria badly needed handouts, used to sustain its economy and support an ailing public sector.

During most of the 1980's, Syrian support for the Iranian revolution, as well as its alliance with Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War, deprived it of most Arab economic aid. Iran compensated for this loss in the form of cheap crude oil and other technical assistance.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the poor shape of the Syrian economy played key roles in defining both foreign and domestic policies in the post-Cold War era. Syria supported the US-led coalition to force Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. This position allowed Damascus to safely navigate an unfavourable unipolar world, winning generous economic handouts from Arab Gulf States in the process. Syria also joined the Madrid peace process, hoping that peace with Israel would not only secure the return of the Golan Heights, but also generate economic opportunities and spur foreign investment. The honeymoon with the US, a relaxed regional environment, and the illusion that peace with Israel was at hand produced a second wave of economic liberalisation.

When President Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000, the regional and international settings seemed ripe for the introduction of far-reaching economic and political reforms. A year later, the picture had changed completely and most domestic reform programmes were shelved. Foreign policy, Syria’s main export since the 1970s, has not always been an asset, especially when it has produced a conflict of interests with the dominant powers in the international system. Such was the case when Syria opposed the US invasion of Iraq and former President George W. Bush’s greater Middle East plan.

As Syria established itself as the anti-US power in the region, the Bush administration contemplated regime change in Damascus. The troubled relationship with Washington and other key powers in the region made the Syrian government feel insecure. As a result, most domestic reform measures were put on hold.

One must not, however, put all the blame for the slow pace of reform in Syria on external factors and harsh regional conditions. A number of key domestic challenges have also played a major role in hindering reform. However, when survival – the first priority for any state – is threatened, every other concern is relegated to the bottom of the agenda.

Since the arrival of a new administration in the White House last January, Syria’s regional and international environment has once again changed. President Barack Obama has focused on Syria as a prime target for his Middle Eastern diplomatic push. He has restored full diplomatic ties with Damascus and eased some of the sanctions imposed by the Bush administration. Syria’s relations with other regional powers have also improved. Saudi Arabia has returned its ambassador to Damascus and established a working relationship with Syria on Lebanon. Turkish-Syrian relations also seem to be developing into a full-fledged partnership.

The shift in Syria’s external environment is bound to affect its domestic policies in a positive way. Today, Syria’s reform project faces more incentives and less security concerns.

(Marwan Kabalan is a professor at the faculty of political science at Damascus University.)

source : Syria Today - September 2009